mponents were expensive, and building system to order allowed consumers to get what they wanted without overspending. Michael Dell saw the weakness in the market (incompatible system, limited store selection, and high prices) and made a business out of eliminating those problems forI like to pick on HP more than most people, so it is odd I now must praise them.

Back when I was on the other side of the B2B technology exchange, I was primarily an HP customer. I ran shops with multiple minis of varying HP operating system flavors (RTE, MPE, HPUX) and thus had a deep love/hate relationship with the company. To this day I keep a number of HP executives in my virtual Rolodex and hound them when necessary or advantageous.

For a long time it appeared that HP's PC business was going to go the way of IBM's, namely "out the door." Sales were weak, and the fatter margins promised by the Compaq merger were not evident. HP went toe-to-toe with Dell, attempting to clone their success without ever coming close. Mass customization was not something HP was going to be good at, and like all things Carley inspired, was heading for the technology sewer.

Two things happened at about the same time that changed HP's PC fortunes. First the market changed. Dell was the PC king when mass customization was demanded by the market. Keep in mind that Dell grew during the period when PCs were fragile, components were expensive, and building system to order allowed consumers to get what they wanted without overspending. Michael Dell saw the weakness in the market (incompatible system, limited store selection, and high prices) and made a business out of eliminating those problems for

ad a deep love/hate relationship with the company. To this day I keep a number of HP executives in my virtual Rolodex and hound them when necessary or advantageous.

For a long time it appeared that HP's PC business was going to go the way of IBM's, namely "out the door." Sales were weak, and the fatter margins promised by the Compaq merger were not evident. HP went toe-to-toe with Dell, attempting to clone their success without ever coming close. Mass customization was not something HP was going to be good at, and like all things Carley inspired, was heading for the technology sewer.

Two things happened at about the same time that changed HP's PC fortunes. First the market changed. Dell was the PC king when mass customization was demanded by the market. Keep in mind that Dell grew during the period when PCs were fragile, components were expensive, and building system to order allowed consumers to get what they wanted without overspending. Michael Dell saw the weakness in the market (incompatible system, limited store selection, and high prices) and made a business out of eliminating those problems for

were weak, and the fatter margins promised by the Compaq merger were not evident. HP went toe-to-toe with Dell, attempting to clone their success without ever coming close. Mass customization was not something HP was going to be good at, and like all things Carley inspired, was heading for the technology sewer.

Two things happened at about the same time that changed HP's PC fortunes. First the market changed. Dell was the PC king when mass customization was demanded by the market. Keep in mind that Dell grew during the period when PCs were fragile, components were expensive, and building system to order allowed consumers to get what they wanted without overspending. Michael Dell saw the weakness in the market (incompatible system, limited store selection, and high prices) and made a business out of eliminating those problems for

ading for the technology sewer.

Two things happened at about the same time that changed HP's PC fortunes. First the market changed. Dell was the PC king when mass customization was demanded by the market. Keep in mind that Dell grew during the period when PCs were fragile, components were expensive, and building system to order allowed consumers to get what they wanted without overspending. Michael Dell saw the weakness in the market (incompatible system, limited store selection, and high prices) and made a business out of eliminating those problems for

mponents were expensive, and building system to order allowed consumers to get what they wanted without overspending. Michael Dell saw the weakness in the market (incompatible system, limited store selection, and high prices) and made a business out of eliminating those problems for the consumer.

But the market changed, to which HP responded and Dell did not. First, components became more standardized and the price of components fell through the floor. My bookkeeping system reports that I gave Dell $3,500 back in 1998 for well loaded desktop. Today a server grade desktop with a quad processor costs around $2,000 at CompUSA. This is due primarily to standardization, which kicked a key differentiator out from under Dell. Take away the need for mass customization, and you remove mass sales.

About the time this market shift occurred, HP installed Todd Bradley at the helm of their Personal Systems Group, that included oversight of PCs. Todd came from Palm, an outfit that had both good direct sales and retail sales of consumer products. Todd understood that PCs were now over configured for the average user, meaning that most users didn't require customization or many feature tradeoffs. Consumers needed competitive prices and instant gratification, which can only be had at a retail outlet. Soon thereafter the shelves of every office supply and computer store were filled with HP hardwar